Tom Bryant and Fred Nickols both made assertions about venture capitalists that
might benefit from elaboration for other readers.
Tom said, "But think of the 80-20 rule: How many of those thousands variables
are
really critical? ... How many of them can the human mind sift through very
rapidly? Can we train ourselves (and share that with our students) to identify
the most significant
uncertainties? ... Experienced venture capitalists can reject in minutes over
90% of the
full-blown Business Plan opportunities presented to them. Humans are able to
make decisions on the bases of many different kinds and qualities of
information."
1. Venture capitalists do review strategic business plans on a daily basis.
Hall & Hofer [1993] document 75-290 business plans reviewed per partner per
year. That is an average of 1 plan every day or so. (One might question how
many get rejected in a "few seconds".)
2. Hall & Hofer is a good read: Hall, John & Hofer, Charles W. 1993. Venture
capitalists' decision criteria in new venture evaluation. Journal of Business
Venturing, 8: 25-42.
3. From a cognitive perspective, successful venture capitalists are "experts"
with more than ten years experience (often in banks and investment firms before
becoming V.C.s) and more than 50,000 "chunks" of information (Simon). As in
other expert tasks, such as chess, there are a large number of variables with a
near infinite number of alternatives. Experts cut to the quick by pattern
recognition, which does proceed on the order of seconds, not days.
4. Fred is perceptive about the process: the reader of the plan scans (filters)
for problems, individually and in association with other areas of the plan
(second order or multivariate problems). If the market and action plan pass
muster, naturally one would reject funding a plan with people perceived to be
problems. When "holes" are perceived, they may or may not be deemed fillable.
Often, entrep.s are told that funding is contingent on getting an experienced
marketing or operations person on board. What I believe that the v.c. is trying
to do is reduce uncertainty (by using the best people possible) in all areas
that can be "secured", so that the investment uncertainty is as purely as
possible a function of the product-market. To wager on several areas of
uncertainty is a losing proposition.
5. Internal venture decision-making is similar. For example, John Camillus's
excellent book Strategic Planning and Management Control (1986) documents how
managers "score" an new investment: Does it involve New markets? New products?
New Facilities? Score 1 point for each "New" and that gives a rough estimate of
the riskiness (i.e., probability of failure). Again, the "investors" don't want
to wager on several areas of uncertainty.
6. Lastly, don't forget that the point of a venture capital plan is not to be
precise in a "deterministic" sense. 1) Forcing entrep.s to articulate the plan
reveals their weaknesses. I recently saw (and advised rejecting) a plan that
had 25 pages of text on manufacturing a simple plastic item and less than one
page about how it would be marketed to national chain stores ("We will hire a
salesman"). The plan revealed the person's focus of attention and depth of
knowledge in one area, but lack of breadth. 2) Almost all v.c.'s and corp.
exec's say that they read over the "numbers" to look for the thinking BEHIND
the numbers. Experience tells them that the numbers can not be estimated with
any precision, but they had better be in the ball park. Thus, if I buy your
logic and that you know what you are doing, I can fund your project.
--
Prof. John L. Naman naman+@pitt.edu