Well, mainly because it suggests that reason may not get us where we "need" to be.
Alternatively, I suppose I can settle for the evolution solution: it is OK to be this way because it got us this far. Still ...
Ralph
Ralph Hanke
Assistant Professor of Entrepreneurship
Department of Management
Bowling Green State University
BAA3025
419.372.3417
ralphh@bgsu.edu
Skype: ralphh16802
-----Original Message-----
From: Management Education and Development Discussion [mailto:
MG-ED-DV@AOMLISTS.PACE.EDU] On Behalf Of Kurt A Richardson
Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2009 3:35 PM
To:
MG-ED-DV@AOMLISTS.PACE.EDU
Subject: Re: Values
... and so now I'm curious as to why it goes against everything Ralph holds
so dear.
Kurt
-----Original Message-----
From: Management Education and Development Discussion
[mailto:
MG-ED-DV@AOMLISTS.PACE.EDU] On Behalf Of Bennett-Woods, Debra
Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2009 12:15 PM
To:
MG-ED-DV@AOMLISTS.PACE.EDU
Subject: Re: Values
Great article Ralph and it is very relevant. It argues for a form of
critical thought and reasoning that recognizes and includes emotion,
intuition and inclination as partners in what we might call human wisdom -
an evolutionary concept in its own right. This basic approach is inherent
to ethical perspectives such as feminist theory and the ethic of care, and
to a lesser extent in some modern approaches to communitarianism and virtue
ethics - none of which are typically introduced in courses in applied
ethics.
Deb Bennett-Woods, EdD, FACHE, RHIT
Chair & Associate Professor, Department of Health Care Ethics
Director, Center for Ethics and Leadership in the Health Professions
Rueckert-Hartman College for Health Professions
Regis University
3333 Regis Boulevard, Mail Code G-5
Denver, CO 80221-1099
Office: 303-458-4271
Email:
dbennett@regis.edu
-----Original Message-----
From: Management Education and Development Discussion
[mailto:
MG-ED-DV@AOMLISTS.PACE.EDU] On Behalf Of Ralph C.M. Hanke
Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2009 12:59 PM
To:
MG-ED-DV@AOMLISTS.PACE.EDU
Subject: Re: Values
Hi,
The article below is an op-ed piece from the NYT. It goes against everything
I hold dear, but what the heck; it seems relevant to our conversation
Ralph
Ralph Hanke
Assistant Professor of Entrepreneurship
Department of Management
Bowling Green State University
BAA3025
419.372.3417
ralphh@bgsu.edu
Skype: ralphh16802
The End of Philosophy
By DAVID BROOKS
Socrates talked. The assumption behind his approach to philosophy, and the
approaches of millions of people since, is that moral thinking is mostly a
matter of reason and deliberation: Think through moral problems. Find a just
principle. Apply it.
One problem with this kind of approach to morality, as Michael Gazzaniga
writes in his 2008 book, "Human," is that "it has been hard to find any
correlation between moral reasoning and proactive moral behavior, such as
helping other people. In fact, in most studies, none has been found."
Today, many psychologists, cognitive scientists and even philosophers
embrace a different view of morality. In this view, moral thinking is more
like aesthetics. As we look around the world, we are constantly evaluating
what we see. Seeing and evaluating are not two separate processes. They are
linked and basically simultaneous.
As Steven Quartz of the California Institute of Technology said during a
recent discussion of ethics sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation, "Our
brain is computing value at every fraction of a second. Everything that we
look at, we form an implicit preference. Some of those make it into our
awareness; some of them remain at the level of our unconscious, but ... what
our brain is for, what our brain has evolved for, is to find what is of
value in our environment."
Think of what happens when you put a new food into your mouth. You don't
have to decide if it's disgusting. You just know. You don't have to decide
if a landscape is beautiful. You just know.
Moral judgments are like that. They are rapid intuitive decisions and
involve the emotion-processing parts of the brain. Most of us make snap
moral judgments about what feels fair or not, or what feels good or not. We
start doing this when we are babies, before we have language. And even as
adults, we often can't explain to ourselves why something feels wrong.
In other words, reasoning comes later and is often guided by the emotions
that preceded it. Or as Jonathan Haidt of the University of Virginia
memorably wrote, "The emotions are, in fact, in charge of the temple of
morality, and ... moral reasoning is really just a servant masquerading as a
high priest."
The question then becomes: What shapes moral emotions in the first place?
The answer has long been evolution, but in recent years there's an
increasing appreciation that evolution isn't just about competition. It's
also about cooperation within groups. Like bees, humans have long lived or
died based on their ability to divide labor, help each other and stand
together in the face of common threats. Many of our moral emotions and
intuitions reflect that history. We don't just care about our individual
rights, or even the rights of other individuals. We also care about loyalty,
respect, traditions, religions. We are all the descendents of successful
cooperators.
The first nice thing about this evolutionary approach to morality is that it
emphasizes the social nature of moral intuition. People are not discrete
units coolly formulating moral arguments. They link themselves together into
communities and networks of mutual influence.
The second nice thing is that it entails a warmer view of human nature.
Evolution is always about competition, but for humans, as Darwin speculated,
competition among groups has turned us into pretty cooperative, empathetic
and altruistic creatures - at least within our families, groups and
sometimes nations.
The third nice thing is that it explains the haphazard way most of us lead
our lives without destroying dignity and choice. Moral intuitions have
primacy, Haidt argues, but they are not dictators. There are times, often
the most important moments in our lives, when in fact we do use reason to
override moral intuitions, and often those reasons - along with new
intuitions - come from our friends.
The rise and now dominance of this emotional approach to morality is an
epochal change. It challenges all sorts of traditions. It challenges the
bookish way philosophy is conceived by most people. It challenges the
Talmudic tradition, with its hyper-rational scrutiny of texts. It challenges
the new atheists, who see themselves involved in a war of reason against
faith and who have an unwarranted faith in the power of pure reason and in
the purity of their own reasoning.
Finally, it should also challenge the very scientists who study morality.
They're good at explaining how people make judgments about harm and
fairness, but they still struggle to explain the feelings of awe,
transcendence, patriotism, joy and self-sacrifice, which are not ancillary
to most people's moral experiences, but central. The evolutionary approach
also leads many scientists to neglect the concept of individual
responsibility and makes it hard for them to appreciate that most people
struggle toward goodness, not as a means, but as an end in itself.